The Nigerian Civil War, known as the Biafran War (1967–1970), concluded with a formal surrender agreement that included essential conditions meant to ensure equality and fair treatment for the Biafrans. However, over the years, the Nigerian government has systematically violated these terms, undermining its legitimacy in the South-East region and fueling the demand for secession.
The Instrument of Surrender: A Hope for Unity
The civil war was one of the most tragic chapters in Nigeria’s history, resulting in over a million deaths, predominantly among Biafrans who suffered from starvation, disease, and violence. Following nearly three years of brutal conflict, Biafra surrendered on January 15, 1970, with the hope that reintegration would bring peace and justice for all Nigerians, particularly the Igbo people.
A pivotal figure in the surrender negotiations, Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Biafra, worked to ensure that the terms of surrender included specific provisions protecting the political and administrative integrity of the South-East region. A crucial aspect of the agreement was Clause ‘C,’ which mandated that any future modifications to Nigeria’s political structure must receive the consensus of both parties, thereby safeguarding against marginalization.
At the time of the surrender, Nigeria was organized into 12 states, a structure deemed fair for representation and resource allocation. This political arrangement was understood to remain intact unless there was broad national agreement to modify it, providing a critical safeguard for the Biafrans against potential future exclusion.
Unilateral State Creation: Breaching the Agreement
Despite the clear stipulations of the surrender agreement, the Nigerian government, under military regimes led by General Murtala Mohammed and General Olusegun Obasanjo, began to unilaterally alter the country’s political structure. In 1976, only six years after the war’s end, General Mohammed expanded the state structure from 12 to 19 states without consulting the South-East region, violating the terms of the surrender.
The trend continued with subsequent military leaders—General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha—who further increased the number of states to 30 and then to 36. By the time Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the country had a federal structure of 36 states, diverging sharply from the agreed-upon 12-state arrangement. Notably, the South-East was allocated only five states, while other regions received six or more, leading to a significant imbalance in political representation and federal resource distribution.
The unilateral creation of states without consultation or agreement from the South-East not only breached the terms of the surrender but also intensified the region’s feelings of marginalization within Nigeria.
Consequences of State Creation on Political Representation and Resource Distribution
The creation of additional states outside the South-East has profoundly affected political representation and the allocation of federal resources. In Nigeria’s federal system, representation in the National Assembly is based on the number of states. Each state is entitled to three senators, resulting in a substantial disparity in representation. For instance, the North-West, with seven states, has 21 senators, whereas the South-East, with only five states, has 15 senators, diluting the political influence of the South-East in the national legislature.
Moreover, the distribution of federal resources has also been skewed in favor of regions with more states. Nigeria’s revenue-sharing formula allocates federal funds based on the number of states and local government areas (LGAs), meaning that the South-East, with fewer states and LGAs, receives a disproportionately smaller share of federal resources despite its significant contributions to the national economy.
The unequal state creation process has perpetuated a cycle of political and economic marginalization for the South-East. This structural imbalance, rooted in the violation of the 1970 surrender agreement, has left the region with limited political power and inadequate resources to address its developmental needs.
Conclusion: The Case for Remedial Secession
The failure to honor the terms of the surrender agreement has severely undermined the legitimacy of Nigeria’s governance over the South-East. The continued marginalization and exclusion of the region have led to growing calls for secession as a remedy for the injustices faced. The Biafrans’ demand for remedial secession is not merely a reflection of historical grievances but a legitimate response to decades of unfulfilled promises and systemic discrimination. To move toward a more equitable future, it is imperative that the Nigerian government recognizes and addresses these historical injustices.